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FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND FIFTY-EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Thursday, 5 August 1993, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. José Pérez Novoa (Cuba)

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The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I declare open the 658th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. All members of the Conference and I were deeply saddened to learn of the death of His Majesty, King Baudouin I, the King of the Belgians, last Saturday. The international community has lost an eminent person, someone who was a figurehead, not only because of what he represented to his subjects and country but also because of his active international presence and his contributions to the consolidation of peace in Europe during the 42 years of his reign. With his firm approach, his intelligence, his likability and great political sense, his exceptional personality won the affection and respect of all, both within and beyond the boundaries of his country. He was without a doubt a committed supporter of the political institutions in his country and the work of the international organizations. Therefore, it is not to be wondered at that the international community has been saddened to learn of this hard loss.

I ask the representative of Belgium to be so kind as to convey to the Government and people of Belgium, and to the family of His Majesty King Baudouin I, the sincere condolences of the members of the Conference on Disarmament.

I now call on the coordinator of the Western Group, Ambassador Ledogar.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): I have the honour to make the following statement on behalf of the Western Group of State members of the Conference on Disarmament.

It was with profound sorrow that we learned of the sudden and tragic death of His Majesty, the King of the Belgians, Baudouin I. King Baudouin, whose reign of more than 40 years was the longest in Europe, was a greatly respected figure on the world scene. He personified the values of democracy, tolerance and steadfastness, which are shared by the member countries of the Western Group. His presence will be missed by all of us.

The Western Group wishes on this occasion to express its sincere condolences to the Belgian delegation, and through it, to the Belgian Government and people, as well as to the family of His Majesty.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I now call on the coordinator of the Eastern Group.

Mr. FÖLDEÁK (Hungary): As this is the first time the Hungarian delegation has taken the floor under your presidency, allow me to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the Chair. I would like to express our appreciation of the diplomatic skills you have displayed in a period when important new developments are in the offing for multilateral disarmament.

I have asked for the floor today on behalf of the delegations belonging to the Group of East European and other States. I have done so to express the deepest sorrow and sympathy of members of this group at the passing of His Majesty King Baudouin, the monarch of Belgium. King Baudouin's popularity within and without his country is often recalled these sad days, and is done so sincerely, not as a mere courtesy. His ability to integrate the peoples of

(Mr. Földeák, Hungary)

Belgium is appreciated by many countries in our part of Europe, torn with ethnic unrest and conflict. We have seen the emotional pictures of the grieving citizens of Belgium, who already appear to miss the presence and wisdom of King Baudouin. It is no exaggeration to say that the world itself has lost a great and exemplary personality. Let me - through you, Mr. President - ask the representative of Belgium to convey to the royal family, the Government and the peoples of Belgium the condolences of the States belonging to our group.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the coordinator of the Eastern Group for that statement. I now call on the coordinator of the Group of 21, Ambassador Urrutia.

Mr. URRUTIA (Peru) (translated from Spanish): May I first of all congratulate you on the efficient way you are conducting our business, and assure you once again of the full cooperation of my delegation and the group which it is my honour to represent.

I have asked for the floor this morning to associate myself on behalf of the Group of 21 with the previous speakers and express our deepest distress at the death of His Majesty King Baudouin I, King of the Belgians, last Saturday. We would ask the distinguished Ambassador of Belgium to convey our condolences to Her Majesty Queen Fabiola, and to the people and Government of Belgium. The early demise of his Majesty, before he was even 63 years of age, has left a great gap in the international community where he always enjoyed the greatest admiration and respect on account of his enormous humanitarian and statesmanlike qualities. The happy encounter of modernity and tradition in Belgium and Belgium's distinguished role in the construction of a European community in the vanguard of contemporary society were always being promoted by His Majesty King Baudouin. The significant contribution that Belgium has made under the reign of King Baudouin to the consolidation of international trends towards peace and world disarmament must also be mentioned. We are certain that the constructive international stance Belgium has taken will be pursued with vigour under the leadership of the new King of the Belgians.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I now call on the representative of China, Ambassador Hou.

Mr. HOU (China) (translated from Chinese): First of all, permit me on behalf of the Chinese delegation to congratulate you on assuming the presidency. We believe that under your skilful leadership we will achieve new results. I assure you of the possible collaboration of the Chinese delegation.

We are shocked to learn of the untimely passing of His Majesty King Baudouin I of Belgium. President Jiang Zeming of the People's Republic of China has sent a message of condolence to the Government of Belgium. Their

(Mr. Hou, China)

Majesties King Baudouin I and Queen Fabiola paid a successful visit to China in 1981, and made a very favourable impression on the Chinese people. The Chinese delegation wishes to express its deep sorrow at the passing of His Majesty and offer its heartfelt condolences to the royal family and the Belgian delegation.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I call on the representative of Sweden.

Mr. ROTH (Sweden): Since my delegation is taking the floor for the first time under your presidency, let me congratulate you at the outset on the assumption of the presidency of the Conference and assure you of our full cooperation.

The Swedish delegation also wants to express its deepest sorrow and sympathy at the death of His Majesty King Baudouin of Belgium. The very close relations between the royal families of Sweden and Belgium and between the Swedish and Belgian people make the loss deeply felt in Sweden. We ask the Ambassador of Belgium to convey our condolences to the Belgian Government and to the Belgian people.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I now invite the Conference to observe a minute of silence in homage to His Majesty the late King Baudouin I, King of the Belgians.

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Baron GUILLAUME (Belgium) (translated from French): I wish to say, on behalf of my Government and personally, how moved we have been and how grateful we are for all the expressions of sympathy upon the death of our Sovereign. We will convey them to Her Majesty Queen Fabiola, to Prince Albert, our future Sovereign, and to our Government.

King Baudouin I, who has just departed this life, was a personality quite out of the ordinary. Having become the head of the country during the turmoil of the post-war years and reigned for 42 years, he was the incarnation of the nation not only in foreigners' eyes but in the heart of every Belgian. Under his reign Belgium underwent far-reaching changes, ultimately becoming a federal State in a constitutional reform completed only a few days before his death. But it was internationally that Baudouin I really made his mark. Not for nothing is Belgium, at the heart of Europe, today home not only to many European institutions but also to NATO and WEU. From the outset my country set great store by the establishment and smooth operation of these institutions, and the King, as its Sovereign, was discreetly but actively involved. Thanks to his personality and his personal contacts there is no doubt that he wielded influence among the great of this world.

(Baron Guillaume, Belgium)

All who met Baudouin I remember one great gift that he had, among others: the ability to listen. He used it in politics, whether domestic or international; but he also used it in a wider setting, being mindful of the plight of the poorest and least well-off.

Not to dwell on the point, I should like to repeat what a journalist recently said - perhaps the greatest homage that could be paid: "All his life the King gave his heart; today that heart gave out."

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The Conference will now take up its agenda for the day.

First of all, may I on behalf of the Conference warmly welcome His Excellency, the distinguished Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland, Mr. Jaakko Blomberg, to today's plenary meeting? The Under-Secretary of State visited us recently, shortly after taking up his present post. I wish most particularly to thank him for the interest that he is showing in the work of the Conference.

Exactly 30 years ago today, three nuclear-weapon Powers signed the Treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. The Treaty, which has for many years represented a partial solution to the problem of banning such tests completely, was opened for signature on 8 August 1963. Many States are parties to that important document and probably others would be too if it had not been negotiated in a restricted setting but in a multilateral negotiating body representative of the international community. On this anniversary, we shall, after this plenary meeting, have an informal meeting to consider the draft decision on item 1 of our agenda tabled by the delegations of Australia, Mexico and Nigeria and today distributed as document CD/1209. The informal meeting will also be open to non-member States taking part in the work of the Conference. In the course of this morning you will have received another draft decision which we hope will be taken up in the informal meeting.

On the list of speakers for today are the representatives of Mexico, Finland, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Austria, the Russian Federation, Indonesia, Canada and Sweden. I now call on Ambassador Marín Bosch of Mexico.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): We associate ourselves with the expressions of solidarity and sympathy conveyed to the people of Belgium at this difficult time.

We are pleased to see Under-Secretary Blomberg of Finland back among us today.

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

Thirty years ago, on a day like today, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union signed in Moscow the treaty banning nuclear-weapon testing in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, the partial test-ban Treaty. Up to 1963 there had been some 600 nuclear tests, almost all of them in the atmosphere. Since that time there have been 1,350 more, almost all of them underground.

Thirty years ago, President Kennedy said that the partial test-ban Treaty was the first practical outcome after 18 years of endeavour. Like the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the others members of the Eighteen-Nation (disarmament) Committee of that time, Mexico pointed out that the partial test-ban Treaty was a "first step" towards a comprehensive nuclear test ban and towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control. It must not be forgotten that those were the main objectives of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. In signing the treaty, the United States Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, said "It is [...] not yet possible for us to guarantee what the significance of this act will be. History will eventually record how we deal with the unfinished business of peace" (document reference ENDC/PV.150).

Over three long decades that task of peace has remained incomplete. According to the sources checked, since 1945 the annual average number of tests has been around 40. In the first 18 years of the nuclear era there was an average of 33 tests a year. Since the Moscow Treaty the average has been 45 per year. Clearly the power of the explosions ought to be considered and account should be taken of the fact that up until 1960 there was only three States that had carried out nuclear tests, but it cannot be denied that the figures are telling. The total number of tests per country is as follows: United States 965, Soviet Union 715, France 210, United Kingdom 44, China 38, India 1. In total 1,950, including 23 joint United States/United Kingdom tests. We invite the representatives of these six countries, and any other country that has carried out tests in secret, to tell us if there is any mistake in the figures.

Former anniversaries of the Treaty of 1963 did not go unnoticed in the Eighteen-Nation Committee nor in the CCD. Anyone interested in the matter can easily consult the records: in CCD/PV.619 you will find the statements made on the tenth anniversary of the Treaty; in document CD/PV.231, those of the twentieth anniversary, and in CD/PV.472, the verbatim record of the twenty-fifth anniversary. On those occasions, on other anniversaries, and in the thousands of statements on the topic, emphasis was laid on the lack of political will on the part of one or more nuclear-weapon States to enter into negotiations on a comprehensive test ban as stipulated in the Moscow Treaty and the Treaty on the

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Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the NPT. The speeches and documents on this subject over three decades are a clear indication of the international community's interest in this item, and at the same time they reveal constant frustration at the lack of progress.

To get an idea of the time that has passed since the signing of the partial test-ban Treaty, just consider this: more than half the people today living on the Earth were not born at the time. The current President of the United States was barely fifteen years of age when he learned who

President Kennedy was. The Beatles were beginning to become known abroad, the Viet Nam war was gearing up, General de Gaulle was presiding over the destiny of France and the Evian agreements had been signed only a year before. Mr. Khrushchev was consolidating his position as the supreme leader of the Soviet Union, nobody in China was yet talking about cultural revolution. Prime Minister Nehru was helping to create the non-aligned movement and no moves had yet been made to establish UNCTAD. Mexico was beginning talks that would lead to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and the United Nations scarcely had 110 members.

Unlike past anniversaries, this year there is something to celebrate. To begin with, we have recent announcements by the United States, the Russian Federation and France to the effect that they will continue to observe their unilateral moratoria on nuclear testing. What is more, we know that consultations on the opening of negotiations, I say again, negotiations on a multilateral legal instrument imposing a comprehensive and permanent ban on nuclear testing have been stepped up. This was clear from our meeting on Thursday, 29 July. Indeed, that meeting could without exaggeration be said to have been a historic one. It is our hope that it will be a watershed in efforts by the international community, but particularly this Conference, to arrive at a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. I must confess that for the delegation of Mexico that meeting dispelled doubts that we were recently beginning to have about the direction the Conference was taking. In June there was a risk that, despite positive signals from several capitals about a comprehensive test ban, the CD would revert to past practice and fall once again into the kind of indolent, soporific state that was characteristic of it for more than a decade. After the recent break, however, new prospects have opened up that some might go so far as to describe as proof positive that past practices really have been left behind. That is what we believed last year when the negotiations on the Convention on Chemical Weapons concluded, and what we believed at the beginning of this year when we got the work of the Conference on Disarmament off to a good start. Fortunately, we can believe it again today.

Today, as yesterday, our objective is to put an end for ever to nuclear testing. Like other Governments represented here, Mexico has done everything in its power to achieve this. In the Conference on Disarmament and the General Assembly, we have worked for a comprehensive test-ban. In the NPT review conferences we have pressed the point, stressing the indisputable link between a

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comprehensive test ban and the limited duration of the Treaty. We were, moreover, one of the initiators of the partial test-ban Treaty amendment conference. This is a course of action we have to continue to explore because it offers advantages that should be exploited in order to achieve the objective of a comprehensive test ban. Next week we will take an active part in consultations convened pursuant to General Assembly resolution 47/46 by the President of the Conference, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, in New York.

But despite calls from the General Assembly and the wishes of almost the entire international community, we still do not have a comprehensive test ban. The reason is quite simple. Neither we nor anyone else has been able to get around the lack of political will among the nuclear-weapon States. Today the situation has changed. What we have to do now - and it really is a terribly urgent task - is to ensure that the unilateral moratoria recently extended by three countries are made permanent, and that the other two nuclear-weapon States follow that example. We must begin as early as possible on multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test ban that will be universal and internationally verifiable. As suggested in document CD/1209, we should do it today, in the Ad Hoc Committee, and continue to a swift and successful conclusion. Actions speak louder than words - let's get to work!

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I now give the floor to the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland, His Excellency Mr. Jaakko Blomberg.

Mr. BLOMBERG (Finland): Let me begin by associating the Finnish delegation with the words of sympathy and condolences expressed here at the tragic death of King Baudouin I of Belgium, which was truly a great loss to Belgium. It is my pleasure to take the floor during the Cuban presidency. At this point I also wish to take this opportunity to express the support of the Finnish delegation for the incoming President, Ambassador Zahran. May I also add a personal word. It was in this very room that, 19 years ago, I first had contact with the then Committee of the Conference on Disarmament.

The Geneva Conference has been working through a post Chemical Weapons Convention year. The Conference had a good start with the adoption of a focused approach in its work. Throughout the year, a sense of unity has been apparent over the need to search new avenues for the Conference. We hope that this time of self-examination is producing tangible results that reflect the new realities of international security. A multilateral focus on disarmament is indeed needed also in this new world.

Mr. President, the end of the Cold War has fundamentally reduced the danger of nuclear war. Nuclear doctrines are under thorough review. Not only has the change in the political situation made the use of nuclear weapons a more remote possibility, but nuclear weapons are being deeply cut and extensively withdrawn from forward positions. This development should be encouraged by the whole

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

international community. Today, 30 years after the signing of the partial test-ban Treaty, Finland joins the call for a rapid move towards a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing.

We have heard with satisfaction the statements by the nuclear-weapon States on continuing restraint in testing activities. Suspension of testing is an important step in the process towards complete cessation of all nuclear explosions. This suspension should not prove to be only temporary. The international community should seek a multilateral treaty banning all nuclear explosions in all environments. The Geneva Conference is the best forum for such a task. The negotiations should start without delay. We hope that the process could be facilitated through consultations between the nuclear-weapon States.

A universally applicable and internationally verifiable test ban should be designed to reduce the dangers of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, which is a major challenge for the international community. It would strengthen international security and represent a further step towards nuclear disarmament. A comprehensive test ban would entail environmental benefits. Past years bear witness to environmental and health impacts related to underground explosions, risks that have not always been fully eliminated. We have been particularly interested in the environmental impacts of nuclear testing at the Novaya Zemlya site, the testing area closest to Finland.

A treaty banning nuclear testing should include a verification regime which gives sufficient guarantees that violations will be discovered and does so at reasonable cost. The core of this verification regime would be a global seismic network. The technical groundwork for seismic verification has been laid by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts. Finland has participated in this work for many years. During the extensive expert work we have become convinced that, with present levels of technology, a seismic monitoring system is capable of detecting and identifying with a high degree of confidence any underground nuclear explosions. However, the seismic network needs to be strengthened, in particular in the southern hemisphere.

The seismic network would have to be complemented with additional verification measures. A number of non-seismic measures that should be considered in order to arrive at an optimal verification package were discussed during the second part of this year's session. This has been valuable work in the Ad Hoc Committee. At this point we can foresee that the verification regime should include provisions for on-site inspections. Furthermore, the verification regime could benefit from such measures as prior notification and observation of certain activities, measurement of airborne radioactivity, satellite verification and hydroacustic measurement. The technical element, in particular the seismic work, will be of major importance once the negotiations start. The result we are seeking, a treaty banning all nuclear testing, will be built through a process in which all the elements form a whole. We expect rapid progress. Now we hope that this work can be organized without delay and that the Ad Hoc Committee will be

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given a negotiating task. We would be prepared to continue this work during the inter-sessional period.

I would like to add that Finland welcomes the revised draft text for a comprehensive test-ban treaty presented by the delegation of Sweden in the plenary on 3 June. The proposal to entrust IAEA with verification is interesting and should be carefully considered as the demands made by the verification package and the tasks required of the central organization take shape. Naturally, it is up to the negotiators to arrive at effective and cost-efficient solutions.

I will now turn to another issue, namely the security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Provision of such guarantees has become a real possibility and a timely task for international cooperation. Finland has consistently maintained that negative security assurances should be made in a legally binding international arrangement providing for guarantees that are global in scope, uniform, unconditional and comprehensive. Such guarantees should ensure the equality and integrity of all countries that have renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons through the NPT or other legally binding multilateral instruments within the non-proliferation regime, such as nuclear-weapon-free zones.

The enhanced role and credibility of the United Nations and the Security Council has made "positive" security assurances more credible instruments. We would support the confirmation of the commitments originally undertaken by the three nuclear-weapon States in Security Council resolution 255 (1968). This could take the form of a new Security Council resolution offering stronger assurance of solidarity and assistance to non-nuclear-weapon States in the case of nuclear aggression. Uniform and equitable assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons through a Security Council resolution could also be an important step towards a legally binding arrangement on negative security assurances - that should remain our aim.

Progress on the issue of security guarantees will be facilitated by further strengthening of the non-proliferation regime. We urge the diminishing number of countries that have so far refrained from adhering to the international non-proliferation regime to make a legally binding and verifiable commitment to non-acquisition of nuclear weapons. Accession to the NPT is the single most efficient form of such a pledge.

As post-Cold War fragmentation and instability is evident in some regions, cooperative efforts should be intensified to prevent nuclear proliferation. As a part of this ongoing process, Finland supports the cooperative efforts presently under way both multilaterally and bilaterally to alleviate the problems faced by the four CIS nations that have former Soviet nuclear weapons in their territories. Finland is also prepared to make its own contribution to these efforts.

(Mr. Blomberg, Finland)

Another welcome step would be to ban the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons purposes. We have been among those who have promoted such a ban by sponsoring a resolution at the United Nations General Assembly on the issue.

Furthermore, the transparent way in which the Republic of South Africa revealed its past nuclear weapons programme and its dismantlement is an exemplary sign of confidence in the security benefits provided by strick adherence to the NPT and to the IAEA safeguards system.

The Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments has been involved in a process through which a global network for the exchange of military information is gradually being built. As the discussions in the Ad Hoc Committee have clearly demonstrated, the area of transparency in armaments is challenging. It touches upon issues relating to excessive and destabilizing accumulations of arms on which international efforts are urgently called for in various parts of the world. The complex nature of these issues adds up to the challenge. New global means to increase openness and transparency should be designed so as to allow the widest possible implementation. New instruments must fit different realities.

There seems to be a broadly shared wish to address, as a priority matter, a range of questions that deal with conventional weapons and capabilities. Excessive and destabilizing accumulations of armaments pose a threat to national, regional and international peace and security, particularly by aggravating tensions and conflict situations, giving rise to serious and urgent concerns. It is natural that the consideration of such accumulations of arms should involve relevant information on levels of arms production and military holdings. These concepts - transfers, production and holdings - are distinct by their very nature. Therefore, appropriate regimes designed for them will not necessarily be the same.

We believe that it could be useful to consider aspects relating to national holdings in the context of information on military organizations. In order to identify possible excessive and destabilizing accumulations of armaments one should take into account such questions as the structure, designation and normal peacetime location of units or formations as well as their peacetime personnel strength and combat readiness. Information on weapons and equipment systems disaggregated down to divisional level, for example, would be meaningful. Such an approach would also be reasonable taking into account the varying circumstances in different regions and countries, as well as differences in the size of the armed forces and in the way they have been organized in each country.

The far-reaching commitments that the CSCE countries have agreed among themselves illustrate the great potential there is for strengthening security through increased openness and transparency. We are convinced that the agreed measures to increase openness and transparency have not compromised anyone's

(Mr. Blomberg, Finland)

legitimate security needs. Discussions at the global level should draw on the experience gained through regional arrangements and the processes leading to them.

The discussions within the CD on transparency in armaments provide useful elements for the work of the group of governmental experts that is to be convened early next year. This group is expected to take the process one step further. Given the existing concerns relating to accumulation of conventional weapons, it would be unrealistic to expect that the whole new item on transparency would be exhausted through that work. Our view is that the world is expecting the disarmament community to continue its efforts in this new and important field. The CD certainly should continue to do its share and maintain the item on "Transparency in Armaments" as one of the central questions on its agenda for immediate action.

Finland welcomes the efforts by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, Ambassador Hoffmann, to develop the future work of the Committee. In this area, too, the object of the work should be to seek concrete results. Confidence-building measures in outer space could offer a chance of producing results. The proposal presented by the French delegation on notification of launches of space objects and ballistic missiles illustrates such possibilities.

Finally, I believe that I am expected to say a few words on the expansion of the membership of the Conference. Let me reiterate the Finnish interest in becoming a member as soon as possible. The expansion of the membership has been prepared for carefully during the past year. The process has been moving towards a significant increase in the present composition. Our position is well known: that all the countries who have applied for membership and demonstrated willingness to contribute in the work should be able to join the CD. Through such an approach, the Conference could arrive at a decision where the size and membership of the Conference best reflect present realities. Last December the then President of the Conference, Ambassador Servais, concluded that "there is a significant trend in favour of a substantial expansion by approximately 20 members" and observed also that this figure could be more or less depending on the situation at the time of the final decision. Our view is that a solution arrived at now should adequately take account of the change that has occurred since then in the number of applications for membership. Given the consensus rule, this would not endanger anyone's position.

I know that the special coordinator, Ambassador O'Sullivan, does not have an easy task on his hands. I wish him well in these last few weeks of the work. I trust that finally there will not be such vital national interests as to prevent new States from joining the Conference. A successful conclusion to the enlargement process will strengthen the dynamic character of the Geneva Conference.

(Mr. Blomberg, Finland)

We can respond to the challenges of today by looking forward.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair.

I now give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Weston.

Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): My delegation has already had the opportunity to congratulate your delegation on your assumption of the presidency. We have not yet, however, had the change formally to welcome our new Belgian colleague. We do that most warmly. We also extend to him our deep sympathy on the death of King Baudouin.

The United Kingdom has always made clear its support for the goal of a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB). For some time we have viewed this goal as one that could only be achieved in the long term. But the realization of a negotiated end to nuclear testing is now much nearer, and it will soon be possible to enter into multilateral test ban negotiations.

We are fully committed to such negotiations, and it will be a major objective for the United Kingdom to achieve a verifiable CTB, with as wide adherence as possible, in a form which genuinely strengthens our non-proliferation efforts. Our view of a ban will be conditioned by the degree to which it meets these important criteria.

The proliferation of nuclear weapons - and of other weapons of mass destruction - poses a real threat to global stability and security. The international community must therefore intensify its efforts to constrain the spread of nuclear weapons materials and expertise. The nuclear Powers must contribute to this process, and are doing so. The global non-proliferation regime has many facets. At its heart stands the Non-Proliferation Treaty, supported by the IAEA safeguards system and national export controls. We believe a comprehensive test-ban treaty could add to this regime, most importantly by preventing proliferators from developing sophisticated nuclear weapons. A test ban will not prevent a determined proliferator from acquiring the capability to manufacture a basic explosive device. But if States can be prevented from developing their knowledge and expertise of weapon design, then a nuclear test ban will have made a significant contribution to non-proliferation.

Another important objective for us - to ensure we have a high level of confidence in our ability to maintain the safety and reliability of our independent nuclear deterrent - will remain indispensable. A CTB will pose particular challenges in this regard, but the British Government believes that the non-proliferation advantages of a CTB are sufficiently important to warrant the decision to give it full support.

(Sir Michael Weston, United Kingdom)

As for CTB negotiations, the United Kingdom will not be aiming to achieve a Treaty which restrains only the five nuclear weapons States, as defined in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but one which applies equally to all parties, and which binds as many countries as possible. For a CTB genuinely to help our efforts to counter the threats posed by nuclear proliferation, we also believe an effective verification regime is necessary. Only if a potential proliferator knows that any nuclear test is likely to be detected and identified as such, and that appropriate sanctions will be imposed, will he be deterred from acting in breach of his treaty obligations. The discussion of non-seismic means of verification in the NTB Ad Hoc Committee this year has been very valuable, complementing the ongoing work of the Group of Scientific Experts in developing an international seismological system. This work must be continued in order to establish which measures are needed to make up an effective verification regime. As we have made clear previously, we believe seismic monitoring will be essential, though not sufficient on its own.

We recognize the importance of multilateral negotiations in achieving a CTB that contributes to non-proliferation in this way, and we are ready to play our part in working constructively to achieve a negotiated ban. We believe that we and the other nuclear- weapons States have a particular responsibility for ensuring the success of the negotiations. We shall aim to discuss the way ahead with them, and to keep in close touch as the negotiations proceed. At the same time, we have welcomed the positive and constructive atmosphere of discussions in the NTB Ad Hoc Committee of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) this year, and it will be important to build on the work already done. We believe the CD should have a key role in negotiations when they get under way, and we look forward to continuing to work together towards the attainment of our shared goals.

As a post-script, let me take this opportunity to confirm the accuracy, according to our records, of our distinguished Mexican colleague's statement that the United Kingdom has carried out a total of 44 nuclear tests.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the United Kingdom for his statement and his confirmation of Ambassador Marín's figures.

I now give the floor to the representative of Austria, Mr. Gehr.

Mr. GEHR (Austria) (translated from French): Allow me first to offer my delegation's condolences to the delegation of the Kingdom of Belgium upon the death of King Baudouin I. We would be grateful if the Belgian Ambassador would kindly convey our deep regrets to the royal family and to the Government and people of Belgium - a country so close to my own in many ways.

(translated from Spanish)

(Sir. Michael Weston, United Kingdom)

I should like to congratulate you, Mr. President, on your accession to this important position. We know you will acquit yourself brilliantly, since we are all familiar with your outstanding skills and abilities.

(continued in English)

I would like to take the opportunity of today's commemoration of the thirtieth anniversary of the "Treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and underwater" (PTBT), to place once again on record the long-standing Austrian support for a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT). Allow me also to remind you that on 14 April 1988 the Austrian Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Alois Mock, urged in this very room the conclusion of such an international and legally binding instrument. As to the PTBT itself, its signature by three nuclear Powers on 5 August 1963 was undoubtedly a major achievement on the way to the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, a goal set by the more than 110 States that have ratified the treaty up to today. It is worth while noting, by the way, that back in the early sixties the PTBT already explicitly acknowledged that test explosions indeed lead to the contamination of man's environment and have therefore to be put an end to.

After 30 years of untiring efforts, we have now good reasons to be optimistic about an early conclusion of a CTBT. The most recent announcements made by the Presidents of the United States of America, the Russian Federation and France to extend the test-ban moratoria of their respective countries have clearly confirmed the trend towards the achievement of a CTBT.

This trend came into view on 24 September last year, when the United States Congress passed the Energy and Water Appropriations Bill prohibiting testing after 30 September 1996, unless another State conducts a nuclear test thereafter.

Anyway, the extension of the three moratoria is an indication of the validity of the argument that the safety of nuclear arsenals can nowadays be controlled through methods other than nuclear explosions.

My delegation has equally taken note of the commitments made by some nuclear Powers to move towards a multilateral process aiming at achieving a CTBT. Austria cannot but warmly welcome this development, which will prove instrumental in enhancing the confidence of all nations in the continuity and reliability of the disarmament policy of those nuclear Powers.

Austria's conviction that a comprehensive CTBT verification system is both necessary and possible has lately been more than confirmed. It is indeed the perspective of such a system which motivated Austria's active participation in the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE).

(Mr. Gehr, Austria)

As to the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban itself, we have been witnessing during the last session an impressive display of various methods available for the verification of a CTBT. Thereby, we have been given a welcome opportunity to reassess the advantages and shortcomings of each of the non-seismic monitoring techniques. I am sure that studies and discussions on how the various techniques could complement each other would enhance the work on NTB verification significantly. However, it is now time to move a step further.

The need for progress on our way to a CTBT is what induces my delegation now to pay tribute to the contributions Sweden has made in favour of the achievement of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. In particular, the revised version of its CTBT draft (CD/1202) is in our view a very timely initiative. Three new elements which were outlined by Ambassador Norberg on 3 June 1993 do, in our view, carry considerable weight: firstly, the scope of the prohibition is a really comprehensive one, since it encompasses so-called peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs); secondly, the Swedish CTBT draft favours an agreement of unlimited duration; finally, the new draft entrusts the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with the implementation of its verification provisions rather than calling for the creation of additional bureaucratic machinery. This option has undeniable merits from the point of view of practical efficiency and cost-effectiveness. In this connection, we believe that there would indeed be considerable benefit in making use of the IAEA's experience. We therefore support the view expressed by the Australian delegation on 3 August 1993 to invite a representative of this organization to assist the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban.

In any case, the time is now ripe for preparations for a swift start to CTBT negotiations early next year with a view to completing them by 1995. The Swedish draft should be a good basis for these negotiations. 1995 will be a crucial date for nuclear arms control, since the NPT Extension and Review Conference is due to be held in that year. Although we know that there are delegations which do not see a direct link between this 1995 conference and the negotiations on a CTBT, it is nevertheless recognized by all that substantial progress on a CTBT will not fail to facilitate a positive outcome of the NPT deliberations.

At the end of my statement, allow me to express the hopes of my delegation that in an historic perspective, the thirtieth anniversary of the PTBT will mark the beginning of an era free of all nuclear test explosions. Let us take this opportunity all together and start negotiations without delay.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Austria for his statement and for his kind words specially addressed to the Chair in perfect Spanish.

I give the floor to the representative of the Russian Federation, Mr. Zemskov.

(Mr. Gehr, Austria)

Mr. ZEMSKOV (Russian Federation) (translated from Russian): Allow me, on behalf of the Russian Federation, to express our profound condolences at the death of His Majesty the King of the Belgians, King Baudouin I. Since I haven't had any other opportunity to do this formally may I, on behalf of the head of our delegation, Ambassador G.B. Berdennikov, who is now in Moscow temporarily acting as Deputy Foreign Minister, and on my own behalf, express our sincere respects to you, Sir, and assure you that Russian representatives in the Conference are doing and will do all they can under your leadership to ensure that our multilateral negotiating forum works to maximum effect. It also gives me pleasure to welcome to the present session our new colleague, the Permanent Representative of Belgium, Ambassador Alain Guillaume, and wish him every success at this extremely important turning point in the work of the Conference on Disarmament.

The 1993 session of the Conference on Disarmament is now in its final phase. We are summing up the results of our last year's work. It should be frankly said that this year the Conference did not manage to match last year's achievements where we saw the successful completion of work on the international Convention prohibiting chemical weapons. Furthermore, it must be recognized that we did not manage to begin concrete negotiations on subjects which are recognized as priority issues on the Conference's agenda. Of course this cannot but cause a degree of disappointment. However, I believe that it is possible to set this right.

The course of international events in 1993 suggests that with the end of the "cold war" the international community has a unique opportunity to achieve drastic cuts in armaments and to establish a qualitatively new political climate in the world, whereby all disarmament processes will be integrated and globalized to the maximum possible extent. Russia's policy in the field of disarmament and arms limitation is geared to strengthening international peace and security and establishing favourable conditions for radical change in our country.

In the disarmament field Russia's attention is concentrated on the following basic issues: practical reduction of arms levels to the limits provided for in existing bilateral and multilateral agreements; efforts to prevent the proliferation of all types of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and the latest military technology; the elaboration of further arms control measures in areas where such measures have not yet been taken; and further improvement of confidence-building and security-building measures in relations among States. These aims, we believe, reflect the positive processes which are now occurring in the world and will undoubtedly help to make them irreversible. A vital role in achieving these aims, first and foremost in the elaboration of further steps in arms control, can and should be played by the Conference on Disarmament, the unique global negotiating forum. We are convinced of the need to draw on the experience built up by the Conference in recent years, especially during the negotiation of the Convention banning chemical weapons, in order to achieve results in work on other priority questions on the disarmament agenda. Here it is important to speed up the translation into legal treaty

(Mr. Zemskov, Russian Federation)

language of the discussions in our forum, whether it be on nuclear tests, negative security assurances or on outer space.

I would now like to examine one item on our agenda where I think we can really count on practical results. I refer to the elaboration of a verifiable agreement on a comprehensive nuclear test ban. It seems to us that conditions for solving this problem are more favourable than at any time since nuclear weapons first appeared. Nuclear testing grounds all over the world have already been silent for some considerable time. In Russia - which from the moment of the proclamation of its independence has not conducted a single nuclear explosion - under a decision taken by President B.N. Yeltsin on 5 July 1993 our moratorium on nuclear tests has been extended for as long as the moratorium declared by other States is observed de jure and de facto by them. In this connection I would also like to welcome the decision of the United States Administration to extend its moratorium on nuclear explosions, as well as the statement made by President François Mitterrand of France, who unambiguously rejected a unilateral resumption by France of nuclear tests after the expiry of the moratorium on nuclear explosions it declared on 8 April 1992. We express the hope that other nuclear States will also continue to show restraint and refrain from conducting nuclear tests.

There has also been a breakthrough on the issue of conducting negotiations on a nuclear test ban. Here we believe the agreement reached by the Presidents of Russia and the United States of America in Vancouver to the effect that negotiations on a multilateral nuclear test ban should begin in the very near future is of special significance. We cannot but note the positive contribution which France has been making with its initiatives for a rapid start to multilateral negotiations on this subject. We believe that the discussion we had at the last plenary meeting on the question of nuclear tests also testifies to the fact that the issue of starting a multilateral negotiating process is now ripe for solution.

I would now like to set out in more detail our views on the most appropriate and productive way of building the negotiating process in order to produce a test-ban treaty.

First, we believe that from the very outset it would be appropriate to bring into operation parallel machinery for elaborating such a treaty, that is to say, during negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, and for that purpose to draw up and adopt a negotiating mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee, and also within the context of consultations among the five nuclear Powers. These two forums should interact closely, reinforcing each other. In no circumstances should there be confrontation between them. An important precedent for such parallel work, as we know, can be found in the elaboration of the chemical weapons convention, which was conducted both within the Ad Hoc Committee within the Conference on Disarmament and also in the bilateral consultations on this topic

(Mr. Zemskov, Russian Federation)

between the USSR (later Russia) and the United States of America. Such machinery for the talks will, we believe, be important to ensure that from the very outset they involve not only the nuclear Powers but also other States, including the "threshold" countries. By using this machinery we could also count on greater impact in terms of the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Thus we are proposing well-balanced decisions, on the one hand giving the Conference on Disarmament a substantive role in elaborating a draft treaty from the very outset, and on the other hand providing the nuclear Powers with the opportunity, as was rightly noted in the statement made by the distinguished representative of Australia at the last plenary, of making a "significant contribution" to the elaboration of such a draft.

Secondly, we expect that the distinguished Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, Ambassador Tanaka, will, with his customary drive, get down to consultations in order to produce by the end of this session a generally acceptable negotiating mandate for his Ad Hoc Committee so that, on the basis of this mandate, we can begin multilateral negotiations in January 1994, when our Conference meets again, or earlier if so decided. It would seem appropriate to take as the basis of our work the draft treaty on a comprehensive nuclear test ban which was tabled by Sweden.

It is our belief that agreement on a negotiating mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee would be a major accomplishment of the Conference on Disarmament in 1993. There would be no shame in providing information on this in our annual report to the General Assembly, which, I hope, will adopt a consensus resolution supporting efforts by the Conference in this field.

Thirdly, concerning the consultations among the five nuclear Powers, in our view they could begin as early as September 1993, right here in Geneva. Of course the "five" would continue to meet after the multilateral negotiations began, and work closely with them. We do hope that these comments will find understanding on the part of our distinguished colleagues. I would like to stress the special importance of beginning negotiations on a nuclear test ban in the context of the preparations for the conference on the non-proliferation treaty scheduled for 1995, especially as regards creating the right climate for extending the treaty without limit and making it universal in nature.

The importance of the task facing the international community is difficult to over-estimate. Hence we are delighted to note the major advances made recently in consolidating the non-proliferation regime - I refer in particular to the accessions to the Treaty by France and the People's Republic of China. Thus all the nuclear Powers have entered into commitments under the Treaty.

I would in particular like to mention that, in Moscow on 23 July, the Ambassador of the Republic of Belarus transmitted to Russia, as one of the depositaries of the non-proliferation Treaty, Belarus's instrument of accession

(Mr. Zemskov, Russian Federation)

to the Treaty as a non-nuclear State. As a result, the Republic of Belarus has fulfilled the obligations it undertook both under the agreements concluded within the Commonwealth of Independent States and in the Lisbon Protocol to the START 1 Treaty. Russia understands this important step by Belarus as being definitely intended to consolidate the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Obviously it will also serve to enhance the authority of the friendly State of Belarus in the international arena. As we have often said, full implementation of the Lisbon accords by all parties is an earnest of further deep cuts in nuclear weapons and non-proliferation.

There are, however, also some matters connected with non-proliferation which are a source of concern and great regret. I refer to the position of Ukraine in respect to its accession to the Treaty, and in particular to the change in attitude of that State to the strategic nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union remaining on its territory. Here are the latest events in this disturbing chain of events. On 2 July the Ukrainian Parliament, confirming the basic objectives of its foreign policy, declared the Ukraine a nuclear-weapon State. This decision by Parliament was backed up in subsequent public statements by the Ukrainian leadership. The Minister of Defence approved a decision bringing the forces which store and maintain nuclear warheads within the Forty-third Missile Army under his command. This gives Ukraine direct control over nuclear weapons. This is an extremely serious step which must not be passed over or, I will frankly say, escape appropriate evaluation by the international community, including this body. Recently, officials in Ukraine have started to put about the idea that the country should enjoy "special" status, as a transitional country temporarily possessing nuclear weapons. It is easy to see what sort of damage such attempts to get one's hands on nuclear weapons could do to the non-proliferation regime. They conceal an attempt to maintain in the Ukrainian arsenal 46 missile launchers of the most up-to-date MIRVed ICBMs, SS-24s. Senior Ukrainian officials now say so openly. Russia, in accordance with its obligations under the NPT, is categorically opposed to such plans. Ukraine is in breach of a number of agreements concluded within the CIS, in particular the decision by the heads of State of CIS dated 6 July 1992 - and signed by the President of Ukraine - that among the successor States to the USSR only the Russian Federation would be a nuclear-weapon State. It is also in violation of the Lisbon Protocol to the START 1 Treaty whereby Ukraine undertook to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapon State as soon as possible. How, for instance, can Ukraine's latest acts be squared with the written declaration it made on signing the Lisbon Protocol, stating that the right and burden of possessing the nuclear weapons of the former USSR devolved with the express consent of Ukraine and other successor States to the former USSR, on the Russian Federation alone? The Ukrainian leadership's policy of acquiring nuclear weapons will have the most serious consequences for international stability and security throughout the system of international relations. It undermines the existing non-proliferation regime and threatens the 1968 Treaty itself - not to mention setting a dangerous precedent for the emergence of new nuclear-weapon States. I would also say that, the way the situation is developing, the nuclear

(Mr. Brotodiningrat, Indonesia)

disarmament process today has stalled. Instead of the hopes for a true breakthrough in this field which START 1 and 2 sparked in the international community, we are seeing a more real threat than ever before of horizontal nuclear-weapon proliferation.

Russia for its part is doing all it possibly can to make it easier for Ukraine to ratify START 1 and accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear State. We confirm our readiness, together with other NPT depositaries, to provide Ukraine with appropriate security guarantees. We are trying to work out a possible trilateral agreement with the United States in order to provide Ukraine with a fair peace dividend. Russia is fully committed to sincere cooperation with Ukraine, as with other countries, in order to help it to honour its international commitments.

We are convinced that the Conference on Disarmament, basing itself on present-day realities, is realizing its full potential and justifying its role as a leading disarmament forum. It is largely thanks to its efforts that progress is being made on the great challenge of our times: creating a new world order based on the far-reaching and irreversible processes of arms reduction and elimination and the formulation of a new code of conduct for States that will guarantee stability, mutual trust and wide-ranging peaceful cooperation.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the Russian Federation for his statement and his kind promise of cooperation with the Chair.

I now give the floor to the representative of Indonesia, Ambassador Brotodiningrat.

Mr. BROTODININGRAT (Indonesia): Mr. President, speaking for the first time in this third part of our 1993 session, let me at the outset join those who have done so in congratulating you upon your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. I pledge the full support and cooperation of my delegation to you in the discharge of your demanding tasks. My thanks and gratitude go to Ambassador Hou Zhitong of the People's Republic of China for the exemplary conduct of his term of presidency. May I also take this opportunity to welcome our new colleague, Ambassador Baron Guillaume of Belgium, the presence of whom, I am convinced, will positively contribute to the current and future endeavours of the Conference.

Allow me to associate myself with the homage just paid by the CD to His Majesty King Baudouin I, who regrettably passed away a few days ago.

My sole purpose in requesting the floor this morning is to convey the message of H.E. Mr. Ali Alatas, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, in his capacity as President of the PTBT Amendment Conference, on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the signing of the Treaty. The message reads as follows:

(Mr. Brotodiningrat, Indonesia)

[The text of the message read by Mr. Brotodiningrat has already been issued as a Conference document (CD/1210).]

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Indonesia for his statement and his kind words addressed to the Chair.

I now give the floor to the representative of Canada, Mr. Dubois.

Mr. DUBOIS (Canada) (translated from French): As this is the first time at this session that my delegation has spoken, allow me, Sir, to offer our full cooperation during your presidency, which we all hope will be very productive.

You will also allow me to express my delegation's condolences to the Belgian delegation upon the sudden death of the King of the Belgians, King Baudouin.

Lastly, I should also like to welcome Ambassador Guillaume of Belgium whose views, I have no doubt, will cast light on our proceedings.

(continued in English)

In early July, Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton announced the extension of the moratoria on nuclear testing. The United States also announced that they plan to initiate discussions with the other nuclear weapons States on modalities and objectives of negotiations for a comprehensive test-ban treaty. France, the United Kingdom, and China have responded positively. These announcements are indeed welcome developments and they bode well for an early start to CTBT negotiations which, as we have stated on numerous occasions, should take place in the Conference on Disarmament. A CTBT would respond to a longstanding and central Canadian arms control objective.

Canada favours negotiations towards a CTBT in a multilateral forum such as the Conference on Disarmament; at the same time realizing that such negotiations must be predicated upon the kind of political will and leadership that has been demonstrated last month by the nuclear weapons States. It is essential, therefore, that the CD take stock of its own resources and expertise which might contribute towards facilitating a successful negotiation of a CTBT. The international community must make its contribution to a strong

and effective CTBT. The final agreement must be open to signature by all and contain strong verification procedures. This process would, in our view, increase in credibility and international acceptance if the CD could agree to expand its membership to include all those wishing to be members of the CD and ultimately party to the CTBT.

Canada is pleased with the positive and constructive responses of the other nuclear-weapons States to President Clinton's important initiative. We also urge

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them to continue their existing moratoria on nuclear testing. There is no reason why we cannot launch these negotiations now and my Government supports initiatives to review at an early stage the mandate of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee in order for it to negotiate a CTB. We are now engaged in the NPT extension process and an early start of CTB negotiations would give an important psychological boost to a successful NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995.

On 3 June 1993, our Swedish colleagues made a valuable contribution through their tabling of a revised version of a draft CTBT, which builds upon CD/1089 of 25 July 1991. In our view, the Swedish papers provide focus to certain key issues, while recognizing that many details will need to be filled in once negotiations get under way. It is always useful to have at hand a significant body of relevant information to facilitate the negotiations, especially when this includes a vision of what the end-product might comprise.

There is, of course, a wealth of material upon which to draw. All of the attention now being directed to non-seismic technologies, and to their potential to play a supportive role in a verification regime, can only be helpful to the elaboration of a treaty that can be effectively verified. The Canadian position is that the elements of any verification regime are already very well-defined, based on the work of the GSE, and could be put in place within a reasonable period of time.

In this regard, we note that the last GSE report to the CD (CD/1185, 2 March 1993), based on earlier tests and their evaluations, elaborated a concept of a system for international seismic data exchange which would provide States with data and information to meet their national CTB verification needs. The GSE is now moving through the design stage with the aim of beginning global testing of the proposed concept at an early date.

Canada fully supports this effort by the GSE and its contributing participants. In our understanding, this would not be another test to compile data along the lines of the two others that have already taken place in 1984 and 1991. It would, in fact, constitute the initial phase of establishing the architecture that could then be called upon to serve the needs of a CTB treaty.

It is also the Canadian view that our current deliberations and future negotiations must continue to include the contributions that other non-seismic technologies can make to CTB verification. Let me be clear on this point. While it is our position that all of these various options are on the table and merit serious consideration, they should not constrain our rapid progress to conclude a CTB. In fact, it is our firm belief that a package of seismic and non-seismic

(Mr. Dubois, Canada)

verification measures could be put together and ready to go within a relatively short period of time.

As an active participant in the GSE, Canada supports the role for a seismic monitoring network, although a number of the parameters of the network will need further refinement as the work of the GSE progresses. Furthermore, Canada supports continued exploration in the CD of the relevance of the methodology and the parameters of a hypothetical network for radionuclides monitoring.

The 1991 Swedish draft text specifies the establishment and operation of a satellite image processing centre which would serve as a means by which States parties might acquire data from available satellite systems. Canada strongly endorses such a monitoring system. Delegations will remember that in May 1993 the Canadian CD submission on non-seismic technologies significantly updated the understanding of the types of sensors and imagery available from current commercial satellite systems and how these systems are evolving. The CD should continue to examine the role of overhead imagery for CTBT verification.

A number of non-seismic technologies and their potential applications, which were included in the Canadian submission to the CD in May 1993 and the subsequent presentations, clearly have relevance to verifying a CTBT. Canada will continue to support the CD in its exploration of these methodologies and consider making further submissions on selected ones in the search for an effective yet affordable verification regime.

Clearly, in 1993, the understanding of the performance and design requirements of a seismic network has advanced considerably, through the work of the GSE and active contributions of its individual participating States. The 1992 Verification Conference in Montebello, Quebec, made a particularly significant contribution in this regard. Major gaps in knowledge remain, however, and these relate to four items: (a) assessments of effectiveness; (b) detection standards; (c) other design parameters; and (d) cost, including cost-effectiveness. The GSE will need some direction from the CD on these matters, if it is to move to fill these knowledge gaps as it proposes to do through testing the concept by January 1995.

The Canadian submission to the CD in May 1993 and subsequent presentations sought to fill some of the information gaps, both with regard to chemical detection from the air and at ground level, and with regard to the other technique of surveillance of atmospheric radionuclides. In both of these cases, much work needs to be done, in order to determine performance capabilities, effectiveness and cost parameters. Much of the required information, however, could only be obtained from countries that have conducted nuclear tests. One of the reasons for the Canadian submission and presentation in May 1993 was to attempt to prompt countries that have, or could get, the information to do so and share it with others.

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In sum, the Swedish text puts down the appropriate markers with regard to airborne sensing and inspection, and ground level inspection. The operational parameters will need, however, to be further explored through trial inspections and more detailed consultations with knowledgeable experts.

It is important to utilize to the maximum extent what we have learned so far, as a foundation for our continuing efforts towards achieving a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, as directed by the mandate of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee. To accomplish this, Canada has concluded that the time has come to provide a process whereby the input of technical experts can be more productively consolidated within our substantive work on specific and interrelated test-ban issues, including structure and scope as well as verification of compliance.

We have come to the conclusion that this can be best done by adding related technical strands to the existing seismic focus of the Group of Scientific Experts, as suggested by Australia on 24 June. We note in particular, in this context, that work needs to be done on the relevance and feasibility of atmospheric radiation, infrasound and hydroacoustic monitoring. These methodologies have data collection, analysis and dissemination requirements similar to those of a global seismic network and, thus, the GSE's experience may make that body an appropriate forum for exploration of these non-seismic methods. Of course, different technical expertise would be required to deal with these new subjects in the GSE. The GSE may also need to modify the organization of its work to accommodate these new responsibilities. In the final analysis, the GSE has been structured in such a way as to be responsive in its support of the CTBT negotiations.

To recap my comments:

As an active participant in the GSE, Canada supports the role proposed in the Swedish paper for a seismic monitoring network, although a number of the parameters of the network will need further refinement as the work of the GSE progresses.

On balance, Canada supports continued exploration in the CD of the relevance of atmospheric radionuclides monitoring for CTBT verification and the parameters of a hypothetical network for such monitoring.

Canada will remain actively committed in the CD to the role of overhead imagery for CTBT verification. Absence of this verification methodology from a CTBT text would be a serious omission.

A number of other verification methodologies which have emerged in the past few years clearly have relevance to verifying a CTBT. Canada will continue to

(Mr. Dubois, Canada)

support the CD in its exploration of these methodologies and consider making further submissions on selected ones.

Canada supports continued exploration in the CD of on-site inspections for CTBT verification. "Challenge" inspections, and perhaps in some special cases routine and close-out inspections, are needed for effective CTBT verification.

To conclude, it is worth emphasizing that, except perhaps with respect to work on an international seismic data exchange network, we are still in the early phase of our efforts to redefine a viable and effective verification package for a CTBT. We all recognize that the seismic data exchange network will likely form the core verification method for a CTBT. In Canada's view, other methods also have a valuable contribution to make for test ban verification. To the credit of Sweden, its draft treaty underlines the value of using a variety of complementary verification methods. Operating synergistically, such a package of methods can provide the most cost-effective approach to CTBT verification in the long run. We must concentrate on constructing a verification system that will stand the test of time. It must be flexible enough to adapt to new circumstances such as the advent of new verification requirements and methodologies. It must be resilient enough to withstand heightened political tensions; indeed, it must provide a bulwark for refuting inaccurate suspicions about violations that might exacerbate tensions.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Canada for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair.

I give the floor to the representative of Sweden, Mr. Roth.

Mr. ROTH (Sweden): As has been referred to and eloquently elaborated upon by several speakers here today, on this very day 30 years have elapsed since the signing of the partial test-ban Treaty. In the preambular part of that Treaty, the Parties to the Treaty agree to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. Now, 30 years after signing, negotiations on a comprehensive test ban have still not begun. However, developments recently give us concrete hope that in fact such negotiations will soon take place. As my country has consistently advocated a comprehensive test ban, my delegation warmly welcomes the extension of the moratoria and the positive stance towards negotiations on a comprehensive test ban that has emerged lately. Now, it is important not to lose momentum but use the positive atmosphere to commence negotiations on a CTB treaty.

In the view of the Swedish Government, the Conference on Disarmament is the proper forum to pursue this effort as it should be aiming at a universal and

(Mr. Roth, Sweden)

internationally verifiable treaty. Therefore the negotiations should have a multilateral character. The Conference on Disarmament is the sole multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament matters and also has the expertise to pursue such negotiations.

My delegation has endeavoured to contribute to negotiations on a CTB by submitting draft treaty texts; the latest text was submitted at the beginning of June this year and my delegation has no unfavourable comments on that draft proposal. My delegation intends to supplement our proposal with annexes, especially on the verification system. However, my delegation intends to consult further before finalizing the new draft annexes. In this way, we aim at taking into account, inter alia, the discussions and hearings held lately in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban on non-seismic methods to be used in a verification system.

Mr. SLIPTCHENKO (Ukraine) (translated from Russian): I would like to inform our distinguished colleagues through you, Mr. President, that the delegation of Ukraine intends to speak at a forthcoming CD meeting, setting out our position on a number of international problems covered by the Conference's agenda. We may also manage to clarify the answers to some of the questions raised today by the distinguished representative of Russia. Those questions were, to be sure, largely rhetorical: in fact we have frequently provided answers, which are very well known to the Russian side at any rate since they have been the subject of lengthy negotiations and contacts. The lack of progress there cannot really be explained away by a lack of political will on the part of Ukraine.

In this connection, with your permission Sir, I in my turn would today like to ask the representative of Russia a rhetorical question. He declared that "Russia for its part is doing all it possibly can to make it easier for Ukraine to ratify START I and accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear State". My question is, how seriously can we take that statement? How can we assess the reliability of the safeguards proposed by Russia in the light of recent acts on the part of one of the highest organs in the Russian leadership, which have seriously complicated the political situation in Ukraine and given rise to serious concern in the United Nations Security Council? I am not asking for an answer to that question; I merely wish to confirm our willingness, with your agreement, Sir, to state our position on the issues covered by the Conference somewhat later.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): Does anyone else wish to take the floor at this point?

I give the floor to the representative of France, Ambassador Errera.

Mr. ERRERA (France) (translated from French): I asked for the floor on a specific point. In his statement just now, the representative of Mexico awarded France a number of tests, 210, I think, nuclear tests, if memory serves me aright. Everybody knows the legendary generosity of the Ambassador of Mexico and, indeed, our own too, but in this instance I think we have as usual to try and be modest, and I don't know if I should say I'm pleased or sorry to tell the most distinguished Ambassador of Mexico that the number of tests carried out by France is 192 and not 210.

THE PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the Ambassador of France for clarifying those statistics. Any further speakers? If I see none, I shall continue with this meeting.

As usual, the Secretariat today distributed the timetable of meetings for the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for the forthcoming week. The timetable was drawn up in consultation with the Chairmen of the ad hoc committees and may be amended if circumstances so require. If I hear no objection I shall take it that the timetable is adopted.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I have no other business for the plenary. As previously announced, there will be an informal meeting of the Conference, open to non-Member States that take part in our work, immediately after this plenary to take up the draft decision set forth in document CD/1209 distributed today. The meeting will begin in five minutes at the latest.

The next plenary of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 10 August at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.

CD/PV.659
10 August 1993

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND FIFTY-NINTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 10 August 1993, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. José Pérez Novoa (Cuba)

GE.93-61981 (E)

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I declare open the 659th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. As we agreed at the informal meeting last Thursday, the Conference will today hold another informal meeting to examine document CD/1209 submitted by the delegations of Australia, Mexico and Nigeria and the draft terms of reference for an Ad hoc Committee on agenda item 1 that will be circulated by the delegation of Australia. At this informal meeting, members will also be able to exchange views on the consultations held since Thursday. I shall convene the informal meeting after we have heard the speakers on the list for today.

Once the plenary and informal meetings are over, the Conference will hold an informal consultation open to all delegations in the context of its work on its improved and more effective functioning. The topic to be examined will be the optical disk system being developed by the United Nations Office at Geneva.

The list of speakers for today includes the representatives of the Islamic Republic of Iran and of Belgium. I now give the floor to the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ambassador Nasseri.

Mr. NASSERI (Islamic Republic of Iran): Mr. President, as this is the first meeting in which my delegation has taken the floor under your presidency, allow me to extend my sincerest congratulations to you on assuming this responsibility. It is gratifying to see the Conference on Disarmament presided over by you and led by your skilful stewardship. May I assure you of the fullest support and cooperation of my delegation. I would like also to sincerely thank Ambassador Amorim of Brazil, Mr. Deyanov of Bulgaria, Ambassador Shannon of Canada, and Ambassador Hou Zhitong of China, for the most efficient and exemplary manner with which they conducted our previous meetings. My thanks go also to the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Berasategui, and his very able staff for their tireless efforts. Furthermore, I wish to extend a warm welcome to our new colleagues, Ambassador Dobrev of Bulgaria, Ambassador Berdennikov of the Russian Federation, Ambassador Saboia of Brazil and Ambassador Guillaume of Belgium.

May I seize this opportunity to express my Government's condolences on the sad demise of King Baudoin to the people and Government of Belgium.

Much valuable work has been done in this Conference ever since its inception and major progress, and success, were made in a number of areas in the fields of disarmament. But I wish today to attempt to highlight some of those areas in which, in our view, difficulties continue to exist and remedies are called for in order to preserve, uphold and strengthen the achievements we have so far had, or we anticipate to have, in the future. It is intended as a realistic look at what is often neglected and not given due consideration. Because of its tremendously significant impact on the security of our world, partial achievements in certain areas of disarmament are gratifying only to the extent that they serve as a springboard for the next step until the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament has been realized. Therefore, there is really not much

point in congratulating ourselves for our successes; rather, we should always maintain a vigilant awareness at what has remained unsettled.

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At the present juncture, one must particularly be concerned that, as the excitement over ending of the cold war settles, the noble expectations of humanity are also being tamed. For four decades people around the globe lived under the terrifying peril of nuclear catastrophe. They were made to believe, by the politicians of that era, that the East-West rivalry was a fact of life they simply had to live with. They were, therefore, to feel secured so long as the balance of terror, or deterrence, based on an abundance of weapons of mass destruction, notably nuclear weapons, was not detrimentally tilted. The same politicians have now become engaged in much burdensome manoeuvring in order to convince the people that there is no need any more to push for removal of nuclear weapons from the face of the Earth; that the tensions at global level amongst the powerful countries have substantially been reduced and, therefore, the continued existence of thousands upon thousands of nuclear weapons on the planet is no longer a threat; and that they can relax and allow the slow pace of disarmament to continue its path without haste or acceleration.

Of course, one cannot deny the fact that the world today is more secure and that the persistent high state of alert has, for the time being, come to a halt. True that no longer fingers are at the button to start or retaliate against a nuclear attack. But this fortunate and natural consequence of East-West thaw should by no means mask the dangers and threats still posed by the stubborn existence of so much nuclear weaponry around the globe.

As we witness today discussions and negotiations are still centred around reduction of nuclear arsenals rather than their eradication. We all take time, for instance, to praise the conclusion of START-2 and to call for proper implementation of START-1. Whereas, with the cold war over, we no longer should devote so much interest to START Treaties. The requirements of the time have changed. Today the world desires and deserves only a STOP treaty, i.e. Strategic and nuclear arms Out of our Plant.

I believe it is quite shocking that no major country possessing nuclear weapons has really come forward in this regard. The minimum expected is a pronouncement of the intention to destroy the entire stockpiles of the nuclear arsenal once and for all. Yet, as we move further away from the end point of the cold war rivalry - that climactic, historical, unforgettable point - the ideal of nuclear disarmament, now realistically achievable, loses colour and fades. This is not something that we should take lightly.

The time has come for a sincere and deep review of reasons and justifications, if there ever were any acceptable ones, for the persistence of nuclear armaments in the world. States that hold massive stockpiles of nuclear weapons have at least a moral obligation to explain to the international community what remains the logic behind maintaining nuclear weapons. Are they waiting to see whether the world is enough secure for them? Or, conditions under which they may feel safe enough to let go of the nuclear option have not yet come

about? We all recognize that, in the post-cold-war era, new instabilities emanating from excessive nationalism, ethnic rivalry

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and regional conflicts have emerged. But the existing megatons of nuclear bombs can by no means have any relevance to these new forms of tension. Then, quite frankly, the world has the right to know who these weapons are intended for and who they are to deter any more.

Nuclear weapons, in my view, owe their continued existence mostly to the perception that they bring prestige, clout and power to their owner which translate into political leverage in international affairs. After all, the five permanent members of the Security Council are still alone in possessing excessive amounts of nuclear weapons. So long as this perception persists, and is not made to alter, there cannot be much hope for a world free of nuclear weapons.

In 1968, the aspirations for nuclear disarmament were quite skilfully contained and reduced to an objective at much lower levels - non-proliferation. Despite this, both the letter and the spirit of the Non-Proliferation Treaty underline quite clearly that this is but one step and that the objectives of cessation of the nuclear arms race and eventual nuclear disarmament remain supreme. Before the important Review Conference in 1995, the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT have a legitimate right to demand a thorough examination of the current negotiating trends to ensure that the objective of nuclear disarmament is indeed in sight and is not slipped under the carpet.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty was indeed a major achievement for a time when the East-West tension and rivalry was at its peak. No doubt it has contributed to international peace and security by partially containing the threats of nuclear weapons. But non-proliferation was never to be perceived as an end, but only a means and a vehicle towards the objective of nuclear disarmament. In examining the possibilities for future extension of the Treaty, therefore, we would have to look at what has been achieved in the CD and other multilateral forums in implementation of those provisions of the Treaty which deal with nuclear disarmament.

True that there has been movement in reducing the number of nuclear warheads. True also that prospects for a nuclear test ban seems more realistic today. But these are not enough. A comprehensive test-ban treaty would be an important effective instrument to prevent further proliferation of nuclear arms in all its aspects. We shall not forget, nonetheless, that it will still be another instrument for the purpose of ensuring non-proliferation. As such, and in the absence of a well-defined and established programme for nuclear disarmament, one cannot be certain of a world free of nuclear weapons at some envisaged time in our future. Yet, even for the nuclear test ban, despite encouraging signals, there are still arguments against immediate action and calls to continue business as usual. Negotiations for a comprehensive test-ban treaty thus remain pending.

The undertaking in the NPT was that the nuclear arms race, "at an early date" should be ceased and that nuclear disarmament should be realized. Twenty-

five years after the Treaty, and some three years into the new era of cooperation, one can not claim yet that the nuclear arms race is over. Furthermore, there is still no clear-cut commitment towards nuclear

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disarmament, much less a treaty on general and complete disarmament. The contracting parties who have faithfully observed the Treaty deserve to learn when this "early date" is finally to arrive.

This includes the prevention of an arms race in outer space. On this, as you are all aware, we are still at square one dealing almost indefinitely with terminology and confining our objectives to some confidence-building measures while the race in outer space continues unabated. We can not endeavour to bring an end to the arms race on the planet and allow it, at the same time, to expand in space. There is an urgent need for a change in attitude by those States which are filling the orbits with military and spy satellites. We therefore need to harmonize our work and engage in real negotiations towards conclusion of an international agreement or agreements on the prevention of an arms race in outer space with a view to enforcing the existing legal regime, while taking up confidence-building measures in the interim. The Earth will not be safe so long as outer space is becoming more and more militarized.

Another area of concern which hampers efforts towards disarmament is the selective approach in the implementation of existing instruments. The case of the NPT once again presents a clear example. Aside from a disregard for provisions related to nuclear disarmament, there has also been a differentiated treatment of the contracting parties. It is no secret that while some countries have even been assisted by major nuclear-weapon Powers to gain nuclear weapons capability, others, simply suspected to have a potential in this field, have been extensively suppressed. In a number of instances countries party to the NPT which have fulfilled their obligations on the basis of the Treaty have suffered more political and economic pressure than those which have remained outside and followed their nuclear agenda at their own will.

It is often argued that means of verification and safeguards are not sufficient to ascertain the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. But if this argument becomes, as it has, a pretext for individual interpretation and action by different countries, then what is the use of the Treaty itself? Unfortunately, powerful countries always tend to act on the basis of their own interpretations of the Treaty and their own sources of information, rather than what the Treaty and its safeguards actually provide. Therefore, further improvements in the field of verification and safeguards will be useful only if it is confirmed that this would become the sole basis for judging compliance of the contracting parties with the Treaty.

Those committed, on the other hand, should be assured of their security through assurances by nuclear-weapon States. The Kosygin proposal, at the time of negotiations, was set aside despite the broad support it had received. But remember, again, that was the cold-war era. Today, the concept is accepted but

progress is not in sight. This despite the fact that, at the CD, only the Ad Hoc Committee on NSA has a negotiating mandate.

With no real move towards a multilateral legally-binding treaty on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, one can not expect the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT to be enthusiastic about the

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extension of the Treaty. We have been for years entangled in procedural discussions ad absurdum instead of tackling the substance. It is quite clear that the legitimate demands of non-nuclear-weapon States in this regard have been neglected. The problem certainly does not lie in the lack of ability to find a common formula; what is missing, is a political will and commitment to make a meaningful move to provide assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

Along with this, there should be an understanding that countries which have chosen not to join in order to keep their option for access to nuclear weapons must be treated differently from those which have made commitments. We need incentives for the have-nots and disincentives for the haves. The NPT should, thus, be extended in such a way that all countries would find it clearly in their interest to join. The incentive must include a binding commitment to what has already been provided for in the Treaty for the peaceful use by all contracting parties. Further, a mechanism must be set up to ensure that commitments related to peaceful use are realized and all discriminatory measures are lifted.

The text of the NPT stipulated, clearly, that research, production and use of nuclear energy should in no way be affected for the parties and there should be no discrimination in this regard. Indeed the parties to the Treaty were to be guaranteed access to material, equipment and scientific and technological information for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Many proposals submitted at the time, including the famous "Fanfani proposal", called for availability of nuclear material from converted nuclear weapons at reduced prices to countries parties to the Treaty.

Although not all those proposals eventually found their way into the actual Treaty, they became the basis of understanding upon which compromises were reached and hence decisions by States to join the Treaty. Today it has become absolutely evident that material and technologies related to peaceful use are intended to be denied to most contracting parties save a few who fall in the category of political and military allies. Discrimination is the rule and not even the exception. Countries that do not have the best relations with some powerful nuclear States particularly suffer, no matter how scrupulously they observe the provisions of the Treaty and the related safeguards. The discriminatory approach in the implementation of the provisions related to peaceful use has been formalized in creation of bodies outside the Treaty, such as the London Club.

The same is true for the Australia Group as regards, particularly, chemical and biological materials and technology. As much as the work of the CD deserves

to be commended in finally formulating the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, as much as we may be satisfied over the support that this Convention received, with over 140 signatories in a short time, as much yet as the work at The Hague towards preparing for implementation of the Convention is progressing steadily, smoothly and successfully, the worries of the developing countries as expressed consistently throughout the negotiations have not been allayed, but have even been magnified.

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Here the Australia Group was to remove limits and barriers on export of chemical material perceived as having dual use, hence restricting limitations to only that which has been agreed in the Convention after years of negotiations. I submit that the Convention is not yet ready to be implemented. But instead of receiving positive indications, we have seen the Australia Group list grow further. We have also witnessed discriminatory moves against specific countries which were in the forefront of supporting the Convention and have signed it at its first opening ceremony in Paris. There is already a growing concern, as the result, that the enthusiasm of many countries to sign the Convention will give way to reluctance or, at least, indifference when comes the time for ratification and implementation. The small number of ratifications so far in comparison with the number of signatories is a vivid signal.

The arbitrary limitations on transfer of material and technology have also already had negative effects on discussions to formulate verification mechanisms related to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction. Many hours of discussion and work among the experts to produce ideas on verification ended with strong expressions of concern by developing and non-aligned countries. They rightfully stated, on the basis of past experience in the NPT, the CWC and other treaties, that they will not go along with an intrusive verification system as it may once again hamper development in the field of peaceful use in another very significant area. They seek this time real guarantees and commitments for transfer of material and related technology by the producing countries before considering new verification systems.

Then comes the question of transparency in armaments, an agenda item of the Conference to which my delegation attaches great importance and interest. After some hesitation on the part of developing States, eventual consensus was built around a resolution which provided the basis of further work by the Conference on Disarmament. One would have expected here that, after long discussions and debates preceding the consensus, actual follow-up would tend to be smooth. But again lack of confidence in the intention of powerful countries has manifested itself in the form of real impediments towards progress in this regard.

Here the developing countries are faced with uncertainties on four specific grounds. First, like other agreements in the field of disarmament, there should be, and there will be, an enhanced security for all. Yet the selective and discriminatory approach that has been persistent so far, coupled with treatment

of countries on the basis of level of political relations, or lack of relations, with powerful countries rather than on the merits of compliance, can put the security of different States at risk. Second, the definition of what lies within the scope of our new endeavours is extremely vague and left for individual interpretations. This may give room to political manipulations of any eventual agreement in this field. Military holdings are a major component in the possible expansion of the Register and should include holdings in other territories as well as military support committed by other States through bilateral or multilateral agreements and pacts. Third, weapons of mass destruction which were agreed to be a part of this exercise, are deliberately subdued, despite the fact that transparency

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for these weapons has definitely more significant effect and impact on our security than that of conventional weapons. Fourth and foremost, a serious and unfortunately well-justified concern that technology and material related to peaceful use and essential for the development of developing countries will again be denied or severely restricted by newly-made clubs. As regards this last point it is essential to ensure that: availability of material and high technology applicable to civilian use is not hampered; transfer of technology to developing countries is substantially improved and facilitated; export-control regimes are curbed and limited to internationally agreed arrangements; and dual-purpose material and technology, while made more transparent, are not denied.

The shortcomings I have underlined so far represent some of the most major problems impeding rapid and substantial progress in various areas of disarmament. To avert this, powerful countries have to take steps to restore confidence and to give the developing countries a sense of trust, certainty and security and remove their legitimate reasons for suspicion and scepticism.

There is yet another area which also bears much significance and requires focused attention. This relates to the regional aspects of disarmament. Problems in this area are varied among different regions. Those who have established forums for discussing security and disarmament can, naturally, adapt to new disarmament measures and coordinate their work more rapidly and smoothly. Problems are abundant, however, in other regions, particularly where tensions and conflicts prevail.

The Middle East is a candid example of how all disarmament measures and agreements can come to a grid-lock. The initiative for a Middle East free of nuclear weapons proposed nearly two decades ago, and adopted and consistently reiterated by the General Assembly ever since, is gathering dust because Israel does not intend to let go of its nuclear weapons. Extension of the NPT stands to meet heavy resistance by regional countries so long as Israel fails to join the NPT and submit its nuclear facilities to verification and IAEA safeguards.

Some of the neighbouring countries have thus, justifiably, refrained from signing the Chemical Weapons Convention. Extended verification measures for the Biological Weapons Convention are likely to meet the same fate. Transparency in armaments also does not have a chance to get off the ground. No country in the

region has yet submitted a set of data for the register of armaments in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 46/36/L. Unfortunately, one can not hope for an improvement of the situation in the Middle East as long as Israel's policies on nuclear weapons remain unaltered.

In the Persian Gulf, on the other hand, the prospects are much more promising. Following two devastating wars, the countries in the region seem quite prepared and anxious for peace, stability and cooperation. Threat of weapons of mass destruction from within the region has been substantially removed after the second Persian Gulf War. Moreover, nearly all countries in the region have joined the NPT, the CWC, the BWC and other major disarmament treaties. What still breeds tension is lack of confidence, insufficiency of

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dialogue and the excessive imports of sophisticated conventional weaponry, particularly from major exporting countries who seek to reap the benefits of the wars.

Initiatives here are, therefore, certain to ensure enhancement of security and stability of the Persian Gulf. Such initiatives may include: regional arrangements towards a nuclear-weapon-free zone and to ensure compliance; cooperation in the areas of peaceful use of nuclear energy; exchange of views on the NPT and the IAEA safeguards and examination of complementary regional verification mechanisms; coordination on ratification and implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention; expert consultations to devise arrangements for verification of the Biological Weapons Convention within the region; development of ways and means to enhance transparency in armaments, including simultaneous periodic data reporting on military holdings; negotiations to curb defence spending and reduce purchases of arms and devote the revenues thus saved to the development of the region; cooperation in conversion of some military production facilities to civilian ones; establishment finally of a forum to discuss security issues, threat perceptions and military doctrines and to arrange confidence-building measures.

The list of course is not exhaustive and may include any other positive initiative which may contribute to the collective security of the Persian Gulf. Efforts are needed, at the political level, to start with any initiative which can bring the countries of the region around one table to discuss their security. A process is sure to follow which would soon extend to cover many security-related areas. This, indeed, is a very important issue that deserves particular attention. We shall dwell further, therefore, upon this at appropriate times in future.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank Ambassador Nasseri for his valuable and substantial statement and for his kind words to the Chair.

Baron GUILLAUME (Belgium) (translated from French): Welcoming the moves made recently by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin to extend their moratoriums on nuclear testing and by President Mitterand to participate actively within the CD in negotiations on a universal and internationally verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty, I should not like to let slip the opportunity now given to me to comment on the two drafts, a draft decision and a draft mandate, which have been submitted to us and to reiterate Belgium's position on the subject.

Like other delegations which have already taken the floor, and in keeping with the habitual procedure within the CD, our preference, while we would not reject the draft decision route if there were consensus on it, goes rather to the second proposal. It has the advantage of going straight to the desired end, that of giving the Ad Hoc Committee a negotiating mandate. In our view, a comprehensive test-ban treaty should, moreover, have to have the following characteristics: it should be negotiated from the outset in all its aspects within the Conference on Disarmament; it should be of universal application and internationally and effectively verifiable. There in brief you have the content

in which we view our participation in the negotiations, which we hope will soon begin, for a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Mr. O'SULLIVAN (Australia): I should like to reiterate the validity of the statement I made on 20 August 1992 to the Conference on Disarmament. In that statement, I announced, on behalf of the members of the Australia Group, the willingness of the members of the Group, upon entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention, to review the operation of the Group's activities with the view to removing restrictions on transfers to States parties in good standing to the Chemical Weapons Convention.

In order to ensure that the non-proliferation and commercial benefits of the Group's activities are more widely understood, and pending the review to which the Group is committed, the Group has, since making the above commitment, also undertaken to make its activities more transparent. To do this, it has been given extensive briefings in capitals of interested non-members after each meeting of the Group.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I have no further speakers on the list for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

As announced at the beginning of this plenary meeting, I shall now suspend the meeting and convene the informal meeting devoted to item 1 of our agenda, "Nuclear test ban". In order to permit additional consultations on that topic, we shall resume the plenary meeting in 20 minutes' time. Once consideration of this first matter is complete, we shall devote a few minutes to the draft communication to the International Atomic Energy Agency which the secretariat has circulated today, so that we can finalize our decision on it when we resume the plenary meeting.

The plenary meeting is suspended. We shall meet again in 20 minutes in this room.

The meeting was suspended at 10.55 a.m. and resumed at 12.15 p.m.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The 659th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

The Conference has before it a draft decision circulated by the secretariat and dated today concerning agenda item 1. I understand that the text of this draft has been the subject of intensive consultations as a result of which there is a consensus concerning it, subject to one slight change in the first preambular paragraph, namely the deletion of the word "recent". That being the case, and if there is no objection, I shall submit the draft as amended to the Conference for decision. Do I take it that the Conference adopts the draft?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I should say that this decision is without prejudice for the consultations being conducted in New York to the same end as we are seeking and with a view to facilitating the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): Mr. President, even though sometimes in the fast lane things happen rapidly, I did just join a consensus on behalf of the United States in favour of the decision which you placed before us, but I feel constrained to make a certain explanation of my action in that regard. It is an explanation in the nature of making clear that from the United States perspective, this CD decision says what it does say but it does not say what it does not say. By that I mean that for us we are not agreeing hereby to commence CTBT negotiations in the CD now, but rather we are agreeing to do so later, after we have first reached agreement on the specific mandate for our Conference's nuclear testing Committee. As our British colleague pointed out last week, we believe as he does, that the five nuclear-weapon States have particular responsibility for ensuring the success of the negotiations and, in that regard, the United States is continuing discussions with the other four on the question of the way ahead in these negotiations. Even as these discussions continue for us, we have agreed it would be appropriate as the decision states for the NTB Ad Hoc Committee Chairman to conduct informal consultations on how to organize the negotiations, including on this specific mandate.

Mr. QUIROS (Peru) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, I have asked for the floor in my capacity as Coordinator of the Group of 21; I am sure that Ambassador Urrutia would have liked to have been in this room now, at what I would term a historic moment for the work of the CD, but as he is attending another meeting, I am taking his place. On behalf of the Group of 21, I would like to extend our warmest congratulations to you for the excellent work you have done and which has enabled us to take a step forward that I am sure will go down in the annals of this Conference and, I believe, opens up a new stage in what lies ahead of us. The Group of 21 considers that the decision that has just been adopted provides the opportunity the Group has been seeking for many years of initiating a comprehensive test-ban treaty that is universal and internationally verifiable. We offer you our warmest congratulations and the Group is ready to go on very actively and to participate very actively in the consultations Ambassador Tanaka will be holding in order to have a mandate as soon as possible, as stated in the last paragraph of the decision.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I am very grateful to the representative of Peru, especially for his kind words, but I must say that the outcome is the fruit of the efforts of all delegates and delegations to bring the various positions closer together and to seek flexibly and in a constructive spirit for the decision we have adopted. I may have played some role, but that role would not have been possible without the understanding and flexibility shown by a large part of the delegations present here and involved.

Mr. ERRERA (France) (translated from French): Mr. President, I too welcome the consensus that has just been achieved on the document and extend my congratulations to you. We are particularly gratified because the document includes two points that we and, I think, many others, have viewed as essential from the outset. The first concerns the nature of the treaty to be negotiated within the Conference on Disarmament. That nature has to do with the fact that, as we have said on several occasions, the major objective that we are pursuing is the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and,

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in so far as that is our objective, we have always felt that a test-ban treaty must be universal, by which I mean not only as regards accession, but also as regards participation, the involvement from the outset of all the players, and secondly that it must be really and internationally verifiable in order to be genuinely deterrent. The second point that we felt to be essential and that is contained in the decision that we have just taken concerns the negotiating forum. We, like many others - I would say like everyone, have made it very clear from the outset that, for the objective we have set ourselves to be attainable, the treaty must be negotiated multilaterally and, as the Conference on Disarmament is the international community's sole negotiating body and is representative of the international community where disarmament is concerned, it is logical that it should be the negotiating forum; that, too, is contained in the document. We are also pleased that a clear signal has been given to the Ad Hoc Committee amending its negotiating mandate as regards principles. That corresponds to the wish expressed by Ambassador O'Sullivan for the giving of a signal, a clear political symbol; that has been done in the penultimate paragraph. That is what I would call a decision of principle, one free from conditions, even though, as stated in the last paragraph of the document, consultations are naturally to be held to determine the contents, the details of the mandate. Those are the reasons for our satisfaction. As for the role of the five nuclear Powers, I will simply repeat what we have always said, namely that consultations between the five nuclear Powers in Geneva, in parallel with the negotiations in the Conference - that is to say, at the same time and on the same topics, will certainly be of use.

Mrs. CARVALHO DE PLASA (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): It is with a feeling of great satisfaction that I am taking the floor in this plenary meeting and this time I have not prepared any statement, so I shall be extremely brief. We have taken the first step in a process that started 30 years ago and that we celebrated some days ago, and we are now in a position to complete a peace process to which we are all dedicated. For that reason, because of the decision which you have just put before us and which our Coordinator rightly qualified as historic, allow me to express our sincerest thanks to you, Mr. President, for your efforts and to those who made their contribution in the consultations which finally produced the result that we now have and all welcome.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): Would any other speaker like to take the floor? The Ambassador of Japan, Ambassador Tanaka, has the floor as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee.

Mr. TANAKA (Japan): My delegation welcomes the decision just adopted to give a mandate to negotiate the CTB. I, as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on NTB, feel greatly honoured at having been entrusted with the important task by this decision. I am intending to start my preparations immediately to implement this decision and I shall do my best and hope that all the delegations will cooperate fully for the smooth preparation of the CTB negotiations.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Ambassador Tanaka. I am sure that the same constructive climate and interest in moving forward towards the treaty will be apparent in the negotiations over which you will be presiding this week.

Mr. O'SULLIVAN (Australia): First of all, Mr. President, I would like to thank you for the energy and the determination that you have shown over the last weeks to bring us to this very satisfactory and very happy outcome that we have achieved this morning, and I think that, although you are suitably modest, you were also not really entirely accurate in excusing yourself from a central and very happy role in this outcome and I thank you. I should also like to thank my colleagues from Mexico and Nigeria for allowing the Australian delegation to work with them in the early stages of the deliberations which led up to our decision this morning and I would also like to thank the other delegations around the room who in various ways and at various points showed flexibility that is reflected in our document. It is a good example of how this Conference can work effectively. As others have said, I believe this decision we have taken will send a powerful political signal of our collective determinations to get on with the work that many of us have been looking forward to for so long. It also demonstrates again in a very clear way the utility of this forum as a negotiating body that can, with determination, attack the problems before it. So, we see this as the start of a journey that many of us have been awaiting impatiently for a long time and the signal that we are starting it is something that we entirely welcome. To assure the last speaker, the Ambassador of Japan, Australia will be ready whenever he is, to commence collaboration with him to start the consultations that are mandated in the last part of our decision.

Mr. KAMAL (Pakistan): Mr. President, we have taken an important decision today which is the first step towards an objective to which many have aspired for several years. I would like to assure you that in the follow-up of this decision over the coming months and year, you will have the full support and cooperation of the Pakistan delegation for an objective to which Pakistan is fully committed.

Mr. ADEKEYE (Nigeria): My delegation wishes to place on record its satisfaction that the Conference has been able to adopt this historic decision. I therefore wish to congratulate you, Mr. President, for the efforts in ensuring that the Conference has been able to reach consensus on this decision. Finally, I wish to pledge our full support to the distinguished Ambassador of Japan, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, in his task ahead.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): As we agreed in the informal meeting a few minutes ago, and pursuant to rule 41 of our rules of procedure, I

shall transmit to the Director-General of IAEA the communication that was distributed today.

I have no further business to deal with in this plenary meeting. Permit me, then, to make my closing statement at the conclusion of Cuba's presidency.

I have to say before I read my text that this is a statement that I have had to redraft and to which I have had to make a number of changes, sometimes on a positive note and at others with what, I felt, had to be some pessimism

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and an appeal to everybody to try to reach the decision. However, that is life and even more so the business of negotiation, and the way things have worked out we now have the decision and I have, of course, had to change my statement again.

Today, our presidency of the Conference on Disarmament comes to an end. During this period there have been events that I consider to be of importance for the Conference and for the interests of our countries. I am referring to the positive developments concerning item 1 of the agenda of the Conference, the total ending of nuclear tests. I hope that the stimulus given in this respect by the important political decisions adopted by a number of nuclear countries, by the result that we have attained, and by the intensive negotiations will swiftly bear fruit with the conclusion in this forum of a new internationally verifiable multilateral agreement that will attract universal accession.

The favourable negotiating climate as regards item 1 of our agenda has enabled us to adopt today an important decision that will unquestionably help to further the achievement of our objectives and hopes in this respect. It has also enabled us to decide to issue an invitation, at a date to be decided later, to a representative of the International Atomic Energy Agency, who will engage in exchanges with delegations on the possibility that the Agency will one day play a role in the verification of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

We also welcome the general recommendations for the drafting of the annual report that have resulted from the skilful process of consultation conducted by Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan. It will undoubtedly enable us to submit our substantive positions to the General Assembly in a more appropriate and practical form.

I am grateful to the Ambassador of Australia, the Conference's special coordinator for the question of the expansion of its membership, for the positive way in which he reacted to our interest in moving this process forward. From what Ambassador O'Sullivan had told us, this forum will shortly be able to examine his recommendation.

I should like to thank the observer delegation of Switzerland for its contacts with its Government concerning the privileges and immunities of ambassadors to the Conference on Disarmament and for the positive response obtained in this respect.

It has been for my country and for me personally an honour to discharge this responsibility. I wish once again to thank my predecessor for his excellent stewardship and to extend to my successor my best wishes for success in his term of office. I also wish to express my gratitude for its support to the diligent and efficient team from the secretariat and, in particular, to Ambassador Berasategui, the Secretary-General of the Conference, who always facilitated my task. To all delegations I offer my thanks for their cooperation and support, which, as always, we shall reciprocate.

(The President)

Before adjourning this plenary meeting, I would like to remind you that immediately afterwards we were to hold informal consultations open to all delegations concerning the optical disk system being developed by the United Nations Office at Geneva. Unfortunately, since our work today has lasted longer than expected, these consultations will now take place next Thursday, after the plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 12 August at 10 a.m. The meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.